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ABSTRACT 
 
Patience is important for consumers. It allows consumers to forgo immediate 
desires and instead reap greater benefits in the future. We can see a conflict between 
immediate and future benefits in our everyday decisions, such as when we decide 
whether to spend money on frivolous products while shopping at the mall, or to set 
money aside for the future.  
In this dissertation I study patience through the context of intertemporal choice. 
These choices are commonplace in the marketplace, and involve choosing between a 
smaller-sooner (SS) and a larger-later (LL) reward. SS and LL are separated by a wait 
time period. If consumers are willing to endure the longer wait time for LL, then they are 
able to receive the greater benefits of the larger reward. Thus, choosing LL reflects 
greater patience, and choice of LL should increase when the wait time feels short. The 
wait time for the rewards can be described in different units of time. For example, 3 
months can just as easily be described as 90 days. I investigate how describing the wait 
time in different units of time can impact patience. I argue that expressing wait time in 
larger time units (e.g., months rather than days) shrinks wait time perceptions, and 
consequently boosts patience. Importantly, I argue that this effect emerges more strongly 
when rewards are hedonic rather than utilitarian.  
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My predicted effects are based on what we know about the numerosity heuristic 
and the hedonic utilitarian distinction between rewards. The numerosity heuristic is the 
tendency to equate smaller numbers with smaller magnitudes while not fully considering 
the associated units. Thus, a wait time expressed as 3 months rather than 90 days should 
feel shorter when the influence of the numerosity heuristic is strong, since ‘3’ is less than 
‘90’. I argue that numerosity’s influence will remain strong only when rewards are 
hedonic, and diminish when they are utilitarian. This is because utilitarian rewards in 
intertemporal choice should lead to a more calculative mindset when compared to 
hedonic rewards, which should decrease reliance on the numerosity heuristic.  
I find evidence for my proposed interactive effect between time units and reward 
types in six studies. Also, in line with numerosity, I show that this effect is mediated by 
larger time units shrinking wait time perception. Finally, in line with my theory about 
utilitarian (vs. hedonic) rewards leading to a greater reliance on calculation, I show that a 
primed calculative mindset, or a simple individual tendency to be more calculative in 
decisions, diminishes the effect of units even for hedonic rewards, and thus eliminates the 
hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry. These results contribute to research on numerosity, 
intertemporal choice, and hedonic-utilitarian differences; and offer a simple tool for 
practitioners to influence patience. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Consumer choice often involves a conflict between immediate and future benefits. 
This can be seen in everyday choices involving tradeoffs between the present and the 
future. When consumers receive a paycheck, they can either put some money in a savings 
account, or splurge on new purchases. Putting money in a savings account might not 
bring immediate pleasure, but provides more money in the future. Splurging on a new 
television will give immediate pleasure, but will provide less money in the future. Thus, 
choosing to save money rather than splurging means a consumer has chosen future 
benefits over immediate benefits.    
The conflict between immediate and future benefits is exhibited in plenty of 
consumer scenarios. One such scenario is when consumers decide whether or not to wait 
for something better. For example, consumers in the market for an iPad have two choices. 
On the one hand they can go to the store and buy the currently available one immediately. 
This would provide immediate benefits. On the other hand, they can wait for a better 
iPad. Much like many technology products, consumers know that a new and improved 
version of the iPad is likely to be released in the future. While waiting can be quite 
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aversive, it will result in better benefits in the future. If one does choose to wait for the 
better reward, i.e., the better iPad, then it reflects patience. In this situation, the 
immediately available iPad can be characterized as a smaller-sooner reward (SS), while 
the new version as a larger-later reward (LL). Such choices between SS and LL rewards 
are known as intertemporal choices, as people are choosing between two rewards 
separated by a wait time in between. If consumers choose to endure the wait time, then 
they get something better than what is immediately available. Thus choosing LL reflects 
patience. It is important to explore intertemporal choice, so that we can determine how 
consumers can be made to overcome their immediate desires, and thereby become patient 
for better rewards in the future.  
One of the key determinants of patience in intertemporal choice is the perception 
of wait time. Since SS and LL rewards are separated by wait time, one may be more 
likely to pick the LL reward if the wait time is perceived to be short. That is, the shorter 
the wait time feels the more patient one becomes. Prior research has identified several 
variables which can impact wait time perception (Ebert and Prelec 2007; Kim and 
Zauberman 2013; Kim, Zauberman and Bettman 2012; LeBoeuf 2006; May and Monga 
2014; Read 2001; Read et al. 2005; Scholten and Read 2006; Zauberman et al. 2009). 
One variable which has received considerably less attention is the unit used to express the 
wait time. Let’s again consider the example of consumers in the market for an iPad. They 
know that they can buy the currently available version, or wait for the new version. Let’s 
assume the consumers are informed that the new version will release in 3 months. That is, 
the wait time for the LL reward, the new version of the iPad, is 3 months. The time unit 
used to express this wait time can be easily changed. It can be expressed as 90 days if one 
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chooses to use the unit of ‘days’, or as 3 months if one chooses to use the unit of 
‘months’.  
In my dissertation, I explore how using different wait time units in intertemporal 
choice can impact consumer patience. I predict that using a larger unit of wait time (e.g., 
months rather than days) shrinks wait time perception and consequently increases 
patience, but more so when the rewards are hedonic rather than utilitarian in nature. 
Research on the numerosity heuristic documents how a change in unit impacts 
magnitude perceptions. The numerosity heuristic refers to the tendency to equate smaller 
numbers with smaller magnitudes (Pelham, Sumarta and Myaskovsky 1994). Consider an 
individual evaluating the quantity of pizza that is available at a dinner. According to the 
numerosity heuristic, the quantity of 1 whole pizza may seem less relative to when the 
same pizza is cut into 8 slices. This occurs because the magnitude of the numbers (1 < 8) 
is used as a cognitive short-cut to judge quantity, and the magnitude of the units (whole > 
slice) is not fully considered. Hence, numerosity is a heuristic, essentially a quick rule of 
thumb, which guides an individual’s perception of magnitude.  
If the numerosity heuristic is relied upon when evaluating an intertemporal 
choice, then the length of the wait time should feel shorter when it is described as 3 
months rather than 90 days, resulting in more patience for the LL reward. Again, this 
effect should occur since individuals will tend to use the numerical comparison (3 < 90) 
as a short-cut to judge the length of the wait period and not fully consider the unit 
comparison (months > days). Because of this, if the influence of the numerosity heuristic 
is strong, 3 months should feel shorter than 90 days, which should consequently increase 
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patience for the LL reward. In other words, use of the numerosity heuristic should result 
in greater patience when the wait time is expressed in large vs. small time units.  
I expect this effect of units on wait time perception to weaken when the rewards 
are utilitarian rather than hedonic in nature. That is, I expect the nature of the rewards to 
impact the effect of units on wait time perception. My expectation follows from the 
unique context of intertemporal choice. This context involves not only consideration of 
the wait time but also a consideration of the SS and LL rewards. That is, a consumer must 
consider whether the benefits that LL brings in comparison to SS are worth the cost of 
waiting. For example, a consumer who is considering waiting for the new version of the 
iPad would consider how much better the new version is than the current one. The 
consideration of certain types of rewards may induce a calculative mindset and thus 
diminish reliance on quick heuristics such as numerosity. I theorize that consideration of 
utilitarian rather than hedonic rewards will lead to more careful calculation. 
Consequently, the numerosity heuristic will be relied upon less when an intertemporal 
choice involves utilitarian rewards. 
Utilitarian and hedonic rewards vary along many dimensions. One of the main 
differences between the two is that utilitarian rewards are less affectively intense and 
involve consideration of functionality, while hedonic rewards are more affectively 
intense and involve consideration of sensory experiences (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; 
Hirschman and Holbrook 1982; Khan, Dhar and Wertenbroch 2005; Okada 2005; Pham 
1998; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998). Thus, an intertemporal choice involving utilitarian 
rewards would lead to an evaluation focusing on functional considerations, while that 
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involving hedonic rewards would lead to an evaluation focusing on affective 
considerations.  
Affect has been found to promote the use of heuristics and lead to the occurrence 
of biases in decision making rather than the use of careful calculation (Hsee and 
Rottenstreich 2004, Pham 1998, Pham 2004; Schwarz and Clore 2007). For example, it 
has been shown that willingness to pay for affectively intense products is based more on 
feelings rather than calculative processes (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004). Similarly, Pham 
(1998) showed that when individuals have purely consummatory (hedonic) motives for 
watching a movie, they tend to base their decision of whether to watch it or not on a ‘how 
do I feel about it’ heuristic rather than reason. Thus, an intertemporal choice involving 
hedonic rewards should lead to less calculative decision making, while that involving 
utilitarian rewards should lead to more calculative decision making.  
In summary, I predict that larger (vs. smaller) units should shrink wait time and 
thereby boost patience in the case of hedonic rewards, while this effect should diminish 
in the case of utilitarian rewards. This prediction is based on two key theoretical links: 1) 
Since numerosity is an effortless heuristic (Pelham et al. 1994), its effects should 
diminish when individuals rely more on calculation, and 2) An intertemporal choice 
involving utilitarian (vs. hedonic) rewards should lead to a greater reliance on calculation, 
since the affective nature of hedonic consumption lessens reliance on calculation (Hsee 
and Rottenstreich 2004, Pham 1998).  
Six studies reveal this interactive effect across a diverse range of time units 
(hours, days, weeks, months), and also across different types of hedonic and utilitarian 
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rewards, such as technology products and purely monetary rewards. In line with my 
proposed process, I observe mediation for the interactive effect via wait time perception. 
I also observe moderation, such that when individuals have a chronic tendency to engage 
in more calculative processing, or are manipulated to use calculative processing, the 
hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry is eliminated. The results are robust. They emerge for 
choice and preference measures, for hypothetical and real rewards, and regardless of 
whether hedonic versus utilitarian perceptions are measured or manipulated.  
My first contribution is to the literatures on intertemporal choice and numerosity. 
I address the lack of research with regards to when numerosity effects will be expected to 
replicate in intertemporal choice. I show that the influence of numerosity on wait time 
and consequently patience depends on whether the rewards are hedonic or utilitarian. 
And specifically for intertemporal choice, while it is known that both rewards and wait 
time can influence patience through separate pathways, I reveal a new interactive effect: 
the nature of the reward makes wait time perception more susceptible to changes in units, 
thus influencing patience. My findings also augment research on the hedonic-utilitarian 
distinction by connecting this literature to time perception, and revealing a new 
asymmetry. I show that hedonic rewards make time perception more malleable (i.e., 
perception changes more easily with time units), and such malleability can extend to 
patience. I also show that this hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry dissipates in the face of a 
calculative mindset, and among individuals who have a natural tendency to be more 
calculative in their decisions. Finally, my results have implications for managers and 
public-policy makers who may change time units to influence patience.  
 
7 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
PATIENCE IN INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 
  
In this section, I review past work on intertemporal choice. Research in this area 
has outlined several factors which influence consumer patience for a larger later reward. 
In order to explore how a change in wait time units might impact patience in 
intertemporal choice, it is important to first look at factors which are known to impact 
patience in these choice situations.   
Individuals often encounter choices between two options where one offers 
immediate gratification and the other delayed gratification. When a child is offered a 
choice between having one marshmallow now versus two marshmallows later, the child 
finds it hard to resist the temptation of eating a marshmallow immediately, and thus 
forgoes the larger reward of having twice as many marshmallows (Mischel and Ebbesen 
1970; Mischel, Ebbesen and Zeiss 1972; Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez 1989). 
Children’s tendency to wait for the larger reward of two marshmallows can increase 
when they are distracted from thinking about the marshmallow (Mischel et al. 1972). In 
the marketplace, consumers face choices similar to these, and in these cases certain 
variables can influence their patience for larger rewards. 
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Choices where consumers are choosing between a smaller sooner reward (SS) and 
a larger later reward (LL) have been characterized as intertemporal choices. Consumers 
considering the purchase of an iPad now versus waiting for a superior version arriving in 
three months are faced with a choice between SS (currently available iPad) vs LL (better 
version arriving in three months). A similar choice happens when one chooses between 
shipping options. When shopping online, consumers often have to choose between an 
expensive expedited shipping option and a cheaper standard shipping option. In this case, 
expedited shipping is the SS reward, since one pays more in order to receive a product 
sooner. Standard shipping on the other hand is the LL reward, since one pays less in 
exchange for waiting for a longer period of time. In all of these of consumer contexts, 
whether it is waiting for more food vs. less, waiting for a better technology product, or 
waiting longer in order to pay less for shipping, waiting for the LL reward reflects 
patience. Patience in intertemporal choice has been shown to be dependent on two 
factors: 1) the nature of the rewards and 2) perception of the wait time.  
The nature of the rewards in intertemporal choice can influence patience since 
rewards may vary in terms of certain characteristics, such as perceived size. Consider a 
consumer who has the option between receiving $100 right now (SS) versus $150 in 4 
weeks (LL). If the size of LL were to increase to $200, without any change in the 4 week 
wait period, then we can expect the consumer to be more patient for LL. Thus, given no 
change in the wait time, when the LL option is perceived to be much larger, it results in 
greater patience (Mischel and Ebbesen 1970; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Thaler 
1981). Other changes in the perception of the reward can also impact patience. For 
example, when children are given a choice between one marshmallow now versus two 
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marshmallows later, the way the marshmallows are presented to the children can 
significantly impact patience. When the marshmallows are depicted in pictures rather 
than put in a plate in front of them, children become more patient (Mischel et al. 1989).  
The perception of wait time in intertemporal choice can influence patience since 
patience increases when the wait time feels short. If we decrease the wait for a LL reward 
from 4 weeks to 3 weeks, the consumer will be more patient. Research has shown that 
wait time periods do not need to change in absolute terms to influence patience. That is, 
the same wait time period can seem subjectively shorter in certain circumstances. Several 
extraneous factors can make a given wait time seem subjectively shorter (Ebert and 
Prelec 2007; Kim and Zauberman 2013; Kim, Zauberman and Bettman 2012; LeBoeuf 
2006; May and Monga 2014; Read 2001; Read et al. 2005; Scholten and Read 2006; 
Zauberman et al. 2009). For example, the perceived wait time for LL rewards has been 
shown to be impacted by prior exposure to large spatial distances (Kim, Zauberman and 
Bettman 2012). In one of their studies, Kim et al. (2012) presented participants with the 
map of a neighborhood. When participants were asked to focus on the distance between a 
building that was close to their current location (vs. further away), participants rated a 
subsequent wait time period as shorter as well. That is, simply thinking about shorter 
spatial distances led participants to perceive temporal distances as shorter as well. 
Similarly, exposing people to sexual cues prior to an intertemporal choice also impacts 
subjective perceptions of wait time (Kim and Zauberman 2013).   
Wait time perceptions in intertemporal choice may also be impacted by the 
framing of the wait time. Thus, in addition to extraneous factors such as spatial distances 
and sexual cues, factors intrinsic to the decision situation can also impact wait time 
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perception. For example, let’s assume that the next version of Apple’s iPad is slated to 
come out on October 1
st
, which is 3 months away. Apple can describe the wait time to the 
consumer either in terms of dates (receive it on October 1
st
) or in terms of a length 
expressed in time units (receive it in 3 months). LeBoeuf (2006) and Read et al. (2005) 
demonstrated that describing the wait time for an LL option as a date rather than a length 
results in shortened perception of wait time and thereby greater patience for the LL. In 
order to predict how describing wait time in different units may impact intertemporal 
choice, in the next section I discuss a numerical bias known as the numerosity heuristic. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE NUMEROSITY HEURISTIC 
  
In this section, I review prior work on numerical biases, and particularly that 
related to the numerosity heuristic. This work provides insight into how perception of 
time might be impacted once the unit used to express time is changed. 
 Numbers are a convenient, absolute and objective way to describe quantities, and 
yet, researchers have documented many peculiar ways in which they may bias our 
judgments. For example, research on anchoring reveals how judgments are affected by 
arbitrary numbers (Brewer et al. 2007; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Wilson et al. 1996). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) conducted a study in which they assigned a random 
number between 0 to 100 to every participant. After this assignment, the participants 
were asked to estimate the percentage of African nations in the United Nations. 
Surprisingly, participants’ estimates were heavily influenced by the random number that 
they had received. The median estimate of the percentage of African nations in the 
United Nations was 25% when participants encountered the number 10, while it was 45% 
when they encountered the number 65. This reveals a strong anchoring effect of numbers, 
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where simple random encounters with supposedly meaningless numbers can influence 
our judgments in subsequent decisions.  
In addition to anchoring, another example of numerical biases is the ratio bias. 
Researchers in this line of research investigated people’s preference for lotteries and 
found that people preferred a winning chance of 9 out of 100 over a chance of 1 out of 
10. This effect happens because the larger number (i.e., 9 rather than 1) makes them feel 
that they have a better chance of winning, even though 9 out of 100 should clearly be 
considered a lower chance than 1 out of 10 (Pacini and Epstein 1999). Related to such 
effects is the numerosity heuristic: the tendency to equate larger units with smaller 
magnitudes because larger units are naturally associated with smaller numbers (Pelham et 
al. 1994).  
 Numbers are often a valid means to assess magnitudes, but individuals tend to 
weigh numbers much more than they should in decision making. This tendency is known 
as the numerosity heuristic. For instance, 8 slices of pizza do denote a greater quantity 
than 1 slice. However, people seem to over-extend this notion for quantities that are 
expressed using numbers with different units. Specifically, they use numbers as a 
heuristic to assess quantities while not adequately taking the associated units into 
consideration. Thus, the quantity of 1 whole pizza may seem less relative to when the 
same pizza is cut into 8 slices because the magnitude of the numbers (1 < 8) is used as a 
cognitive short-cut, and the magnitude of the units (whole > slice) is not fully considered. 
Pelham et al. (1994) found evidence of this in one of their studies. They asked 
participants to judge the area of a circle. However, in one condition the circle was one 
whole circle, while in another condition the circle was divided into multiple sectors. Even 
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though both circles were of the exact same area, participants rated the area of the circle to 
be larger when it was divided into multiple sectors rather than presented as a whole 
circle. Thus, participants relied more on the numerical comparison of many sectors vs. 1 
circle, and did not fully consider the difference in units (sectors vs. circle).  
The numerosity effect has been found in consumer contexts as well. For example, 
when consumers engage in currency comparisons, numerosity effects are likely. Given 
the currency exchange rate of Yen vs. Won (1 Japanese Yen = 10 Korean Won), 1,000 
Yen should appear equivalent to 10,000 Won. However, 1,000 Yen are perceived to be of 
much lower value because people once again rely more on the numerical comparison 
(1,000 < 10,000) than on the comparison between the currency units (Raghubir and 
Srivastava 2002; Wertenbroch et al. 2007).  Other research has revealed that numerosity 
effects extend to a variety of quantities, including time (Burson et al. 2009; Pandelaere et 
al. 2011). Pandelaere et al. (2011) presented participants with two dishwashers. In one 
condition, the two dishwashers were said to have a warranty period of 7 years and 9 years 
respectively, while in another condition the warranty period was expressed as 84 months 
and 108 months. Thus the warranty periods were the same in both conditions, but just 
expressed in different units. They found that participants rated the difference between the 
two warranty periods as shorter when they were expressed in terms of years rather than 
months.  
Given the robust evidence of numerosity effects in past research, we can see how 
it can impact wait time. According to numerosity, the same quantity of wait time should 
be perceived to be smaller in the case of larger (vs. smaller) time units because people 
will use the smaller (vs. larger) numbers as a cue for shorter wait time. In other words, 
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expressing wait time in terms of larger time units (e.g., as 3 months instead of 90 days) 
should shrink wait time perception. Past work has only peripherally explored these 
effects. As discussed in the last section, LeBoeuf (2006) and Read et al. (2005) focused 
on how expressing wait time in dates versus lengths impacts patience in intertemporal 
choice, and thus did not fully explore how using different units of time (e.g., months 
rather than days) to express the wait time can impact wait time perceptions, and 
consequently patience. In one study each, they do manipulate wait time units (e.g., 
months versus weeks), but do not find any significant effects on patience. Monga and 
Bagchi (2012) also conducted a study in which they vary wait time units in an 
intertemporal choice, but in their study participants were induced to be in specific 
mindsets before they faced the intertemporal choice. Thus, the default effect of units on 
patience (i.e., when no specific mindsets are induced) was not explored. Given the 
robustness of numerosity effects found in contexts other than intertemporal choice, the 
lack of significant effects found by LeBoeuf (2006) and Read et al. (2005), which are the 
only works to examine an effect of units on patience, is surprising. This suggests that 
there may be a boundary condition that determines when numerosity effects may emerge, 
one which is yet to be explored. We know from past research that intertemporal choices 
can be influenced not just by wait time perception, but also by the nature of the rewards. 
Thus, it is possible that the nature of the rewards can impact the effect of units on 
patience. In the next section, I discuss how the hedonic vs. utilitarian nature of rewards 
may influence the effect of units on patience. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HEDONIC VS. UTILITARIAN CONSUMPTION 
 
In this section, I review how past research has distinguished hedonic consumption 
from utilitarian consumption. Further, I also review how the distinction between hedonic 
and utilitarian consumption may impact a consumer’s mode of thinking when making a 
decision. 
Consumers’ motives for seeking products and experiences can vary. Buying a 
computer to stream movies is a different motive when compared to buying a computer to 
work on school projects. When one intends to stream movies, the computer is evaluated 
based on all the fun and joy that it will bring, while when one intends to work on school 
projects, the computer is evaluated based on all the usefulness that it will bring. 
Fundamentally, in the former case, the computer serves hedonic gratification, while in the 
latter, it serves utilitarian fulfillment (Batra & Ahtola 1991; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; 
Khan et al. 2005). Utilitarian goods are associated with characteristics such as cognition, 
goal orientation, functionality, and practicality while hedonic goods are associated with 
characteristics such as affect, sensory experiences, aesthetics, fantasy, and fun 
(Hirschman and Holbrook 1982; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998). Thus, utilitarian goods are 
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less affectively intense because their primary purpose is to fulfill an instrumental goal, 
such as necessary tasks that one must complete, while hedonic goods are more affectively 
intense, since they fulfill a consummatory goal such as fun and pleasure (Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000; Khan et al. 2005; Okada 2005; Pham 1998, Strahilevitz 1999).  
The differences between hedonic and utilitarian consumption can lead to strong 
differences in decision making. For example, compared to utilitarian consumption, 
hedonic consumption can lead to a sense of guilt, since fun and enjoyment is seen as a 
luxury that one cannot afford when compared to the more functional purpose of 
utilitarian consumption (Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Okada 2005; Strahilevitz and Myers 
1998). Because of this associated guilt, people find it hard to justify the consumption of 
hedonic goods when compared to the consumption of utilitarian goods (Kivetz and 
Simonson 2002; Okada 2005; Okada and Hoch 2012). Utilitarian goods tend to evoke 
thoughts of goal achievement, efficiency and functionality, which are important factors to 
consumers as opposed to the thoughts of fun and enjoyment that hedonic goods evoke. 
Given these differences, utilitarian and hedonic goods may lead to different modes of 
thinking when making a decision.  
Past work has theorized that decisions may be guided by two modes of thinking: 
intuition and reason (Epstein 1994, Kahneman 1973; Kahneman 2003; Schwarz and 
Clore 2007, Stanovich and West 2000). The intuitive mode of thinking is fast and 
effortless, and tends to be more emotional, while the reasoning mode is slow and 
effortful, and tends to be more deliberative. Thus, use of effortless heuristics like 
numerosity should be more likely when the intuitive mode is active, such as when 
individuals are relying more on emotion and feelings. Further, the heuristic-systematic 
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model, also similarly points to two modes of thinking: one based on heuristics, and the 
other more on careful calculation (Chaiken 1980, Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly 1989, 
Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994, Petty and Cacioppo 1984). Certain decisions situations 
can motivate individuals to use more calculative (systematic) processing rather than 
heuristic processing, such as when individuals decide based on conflicting information 
(Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994, Petty and Cacioppo 1984). For example, Chaiken and 
Maheswaran (1994) tested the persuasiveness of messages. When the messages involved 
two pieces of information that contradicted each other, participants were more likely to 
be careful and calculative in their evaluation of how persuasive the message is. When the 
two pieces of information were not contradicting each other, participants were more 
likely to be careless and instead rely on heuristics in their evaluations of message 
persuasiveness. Thus, the greater feelings a decision situation evokes, or the less carefully 
one thinks about a decision, the more likely it should be that heuristics such as 
numerosity are relied upon.  
Consumption that signals affect has also generally been found to shift decision 
makers away from calculative decision making (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004, Pham 
1998, Pham 2004, Schwarz and Clore 2007). For example, Pham (1998) conducted a 
study where participants’ hedonic and utilitarian motives were manipulated. In one 
condition, participants were told that they need to go watch a movie because it’s 
enjoyable, while in another condition they were told that they need to go watch a movie 
because it’s part of a school assignment. Pham (1998) found that participants’ incidental 
mood, whether it was positive or negative, affected their decision of whether to go watch 
the movie or not more when the motive was hedonic, and less when it was utilitarian. 
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Thus, participants were using a ‘how do I feel about it’ heuristic when they evaluated the 
movie as being hedonic, but did not use this heuristic when they evaluated the movie as 
being utilitarian.  
Affect can also influence decision processes when people simply evaluate 
affectively intense vs. less intense stimuli. Work by Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) 
suggests that when participants evaluate stimuli based more on affect, their decisions are 
based less on careful calculative processes and more on their feelings. Hence, given the 
affective nature of hedonic consumption, it is likely that an intertemporal choice 
involving hedonic (vs. utilitarian) rewards will lead to lesser reliance on a calculative 
mindset, and thus a greater use of heuristics such as numerosity. In the next section, I 
develop my theoretical predictions for how a change in wait time units may impact 
intertemporal choice differently, depending on whether the rewards are hedonic vs. 
utilitarian in nature. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this section, I now formulate my predictions. In the previous sections, I 
outlined a number of key findings from past literature: Firstly, in an intertemporal choice 
between a smaller sooner reward (SS) and a larger later reward (LL), the shorter the wait 
time feels for the LL reward, the more likely one is to wait for the LL reward. That is, 
shortened wait time perceptions boost patience. Secondly, according to the numerosity 
heuristic, using larger (vs. smaller) units of wait time should shorten wait time 
perception. However, given past work on numerosity and intertemporal choice, it is not 
clear whether a change in units impacts patience in intertemporal choice. Lastly, 
compared to hedonic rewards, utilitarian rewards should lead to a more calculative 
mindset, which should reduce the use of heuristics in decision making. I now bring these 
key findings together and formally state my predictions.  
If consumers rely on the numerosity heuristic when evaluating an intertemporal 
choice, the wait time for the larger later reward (LL) should appear smaller in the case of 
larger (vs. smaller) time units, because people will use the smaller (vs. larger) numbers as 
a cue for shorter wait time. In other words, larger time units (e.g., 3 months instead of 90 
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days) should shrink wait time perception, which should then result in higher patience for 
the LL option. Given the robust evidence on numerosity effects provided by past work, 
one would expect this effect of units to influence intertemporal choice. That is, one can 
expect the numerosity heuristic to be relied upon in intertemporal choice. However, given 
that an intertemporal choice involves not only the perception of the wait time but also an 
evaluation of a smaller reward and a larger reward, the strength of the numerosity effect 
may vary with the type of rewards under consideration. 
Since numerosity is a heuristic which involves overweighing numerical 
comparisons and underweighting unit comparisons, numerosity effects should weaken 
when individuals are being more careful and calculative in their decision making. Thus 
far, numerosity effects related to time have generally not been observed in situations akin 
to intertemporal choice. For example, making a simple judgment of how long the 
difference between 7 days and 14 days feels as opposed to that between 1 week and 2 
weeks might not involve a careful and calculative evaluation. People may well use a 
heuristic to decide on how long the time period feels in such evaluations. An 
intertemporal choice on the other hand involves not only an evaluation of a magnitude, 
i.e., the wait time, but also a comparison between SS and LL rewards, as one must choose 
whether to wait for the LL reward. The nature of these rewards might influence people’s 
decision making. Thus, while numerosity effects should be expected to replicate for wait 
time perception in intertemporal choice, this might not always be the case. If the rewards 
under consideration promote the use of calculation, rather than heuristics, numerosity 
effects might not emerge. This possibility is exemplified by the fact that there have been 
no consistent effects found in the few studies where numerosity effects have been looked 
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at in intertemporal choice, which I discussed earlier in the literature review. I theorize 
that the type of rewards in intertemporal choice can heavily influence the strength of 
numerosity effects.  
Given the hedonic-utilitarian distinction in consumption, we can see that an 
intertemporal choice involving utilitarian rewards would lead to a comparison between 
SS and LL based on functional properties, while that involving hedonic rewards would 
lead to a comparison based on affective properties. For example, consider a consumer 
who is thinking about whether to get the current version of the iPad or wait for the new 
one. The consumer may intend to use the iPad for either more utilitarian purposes (use it 
to become efficient and organized) or for more hedonic purposes (use it to listen to music 
and watch videos). In the utilitarian case, the consumer would be comparing SS (current 
version of the iPad) and LL (new version of the iPad) on the basis of functional properties 
(i.e., the new version will allow me to achieve my goals better). In the hedonic case, the 
consumer would be comparing SS and LL on the basis of affective properties (i.e., the 
new version will bring me more pleasure).  
Since utilitarian (vs. hedonic) rewards evoke a greater sense of function (vs. 
feeling), and are less affectively intense, it is likely that they also lead to a more careful 
and calculative mindset rather than one based on feelings. This is supported by past 
research which has linked affect with a greater use of feelings rather than calculation 
(e.g., Pham 1998, Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004).  Hence, an intertemporal choice 
involving hedonic rewards should lead to a lesser use of calculation, and a greater use of 
the numerosity heuristic, while that involving utilitarian rewards should lead to a greater 
use of calculation, and a lesser use of the numerosity heuristic. I therefore predict that 
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larger (vs. smaller) units should shrink wait time and thereby boost patience in the case of 
hedonic rewards, while this effect of units should diminish in the case of utilitarian 
rewards. Formally: 
H1: Using larger (vs. smaller) units of wait time in intertemporal choice will lead 
to an increase in patience when the rewards are hedonic. This effect of units will 
diminish when the rewards are utilitarian.  
An increase in patience will occur because participants will perceive the wait time 
for the LL reward to be shorter when the wait time units are large (vs. small). Thus, the 
interactive effect of reward type and time units on patience should be mediated by wait 
time perception. Formally: 
H2: The interactive effect of wait time units and reward type on patience (H1) 
will be mediated by wait time perception. 
Given my theorizing that reliance on the numerosity heuristic should decrease 
when rewards are utilitarian due to a shift towards a more calculative mindset, if 
individuals are made to rely on a more calculative mindset then numerosity effects should 
be diminished for hedonic rewards as well. Thus, for individuals who chronically engage 
in more careful calculation, or who are primed to be in a calculative mindset, the effect of 
units in the case of hedonic rewards should diminish, while there should be no effect on 
utilitarian rewards, since in that case individuals are already more likely to be in a 
calculative mindset. Consequently, the asymmetry in how numerosity influences time 
perception, and patience, for hedonic versus utilitarian rewards should diminish when 
decision makers have a calculative mindset.  Formally: 
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H3: The interactive effect of wait time units and reward type on patience (H1) 
will be moderated by reliance on a calculative mindset such that greater (vs. 
lesser) reliance on a calculative mindset will eliminate the hedonic-utilitarian 
asymmetry predicted by H1.  
In the next section I discuss the studies I conducted in order to test the predictions 
made in H1, H2 and H3. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
STUDIES 
 
To test my hypotheses, I conducted six studies. Study 1 examines an 
intertemporal choice situation between SS and LL rewards, with wait time being 
described in either small or large units. In support of H1, larger (vs. smaller) units of wait 
time boost patience in the case of hedonic rewards, but this effect is not observed in the 
case of utilitarian rewards. I replicate this interaction in study 2 by employing a study that 
involves a choice between monetary rewards that are real rather than hypothetical. The 
same interaction emerges for preference in study 3 when I measure rather than 
manipulate hedonic versus utilitarian rewards. Hence, I once again find support for H1. 
Additionally, I find support for H2 in study 3 as well, where I measure time perception. I 
find that my results are indeed due to the numerosity of time units; the effect of units on 
patience is mediated by how long the wait time is perceived to be.  In study 4, I find 
further evidence for H1 and H2 while using a different intertemporal choice context. In 
this context, the LL product is the same as the SS product, but involves cheaper product 
shipping (i.e., standard rather than expedited).  
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In studies 5 and 6, in addition to support for H1 and H2, I find support for H3. I 
use moderation to verify my argument about the effect of units emerging for hedonic (vs. 
utilitarian) rewards due to utilitarian rewards shifting individuals towards a more 
calculative mindset. Specifically, in study 5, I show that for those more inclined to be 
calculative in their decisions, the effect of units on time perceptions for hedonic rewards 
is diminished, and thus the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry is erased. And in study 6, I 
show that when individuals are primed to use more calculation in decision making, the 
effect of units on time perception and patience for hedonic rewards is diminished, and 
thus the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry is once again erased.  
 
6.1 STUDY 1 
 
In the context of a new version of an electronic device, I test H1, in order to see 
whether time units interact with reward type to influence patience. This study involves a 
hypothetical scenario of a choice between buying a tablet computer right away (SS) or 
buying an improved version that would be available at the same price at a later date (LL). 
The time until the release date of the new, improved, version is expressed in either days 
or months. The tablet is manipulated to have a hedonic or a utilitarian purpose. I expect 
participants to be more patient (i.e., more likely to opt for the new version) when the time 
units are large (vs. small), provided the tablet is framed as hedonic. This effect should be 
diminished when the tablet is framed as utilitarian. 
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Method 
 
Two hundred and twenty three undergraduate students (Mage = 21, female = 60%) 
successfully participated in the study. This is the number of participants left after five 
responses were excluded based on incorrect answers to an attention-filter question: “This 
question is just to make sure that you are paying attention to this survey. Please mark ‘2’ 
as your response.”  
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (time unit: small, large) X 2 (reward 
type: hedonic, utilitarian) between subjects design. Those in the hedonic [utilitarian] 
condition read the following scenario:  
“Imagine that you do not have a tablet computer at this point, but would 
like to buy one. Your friends have told you great things about one 
particular tablet. This tablet is not really for making life more efficient and 
organized, but simply for making it more fun and enjoyable [This tablet is 
not really for making life more fun and enjoyable, but simply for making it 
more efficient and organized]. You cannot wait to get this tablet. You head 
on over to a retail website with the intention of buying it. You search for 
the tablet and arrive at its product page. You see the following price 
information: ‘Get this tablet now for $299!’”  
Then, in the small [large] time unit condition, participants read: 
“However, you also notice the following on the same page: ‘A new 
version of this tablet will be releasing in 120 days [4 months] for $299. It 
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will have upgraded hardware and software.’ You are now faced with the 
decision of whether to buy the tablet right now, or to hold off and get the 
new version. What is your decision?”  
All participants then indicated whether they would choose to buy the tablet right 
now or hold off and get the new version. Participants then answered the following 
question as a manipulation check for the hedonic-utilitarian manipulation: “While 
deciding to get it now or later, did you anticipate using the tablet for fun or for work?” on 
a 0 to 100 slider scale with 0 = work and 100 = fun. (For all 0-100 scales that I employed 
in this dissertation, the numerical values on the slider scale were not visible to 
participants.) Finally, participants answered standard demographic questions and the 
attention-filter question described earlier. 
 
Results 
 
Check for hedonic-utilitarian manipulation. A 2-way ANOVA confirmed that the 
manipulation worked. There was a significant main effect of reward type such that 
participants rated the tablet to be more hedonic in the hedonic condition (MHedonic = 62.50) 
than in the utilitarian condition (MUtilitarian = 50.09; F(1, 219) = 13.95, p < .001). There 
was no significant main effect of time unit, and no significant interaction (ps > .1).  
Choice. I conducted a binary logistic regression with time unit (large = -1, small = 
1) and reward type (hedonic = -1, utilitarian = 1) as the independent variables and choice 
(buy now = 0, buy later = 1) as the dependent variable. A significant 2-way interaction 
28 
 
emerged between time unit and reward type (β = .72, z = 2.40, p < .05). The main effect 
of time unit was significant (β = -.61, z = -2.05, p < .05), while that of reward type was 
not (β = -.42, z = -1.42, p > .10). As predicted, when the tablet was hedonic, participants 
chose the superior version significantly more in the large unit condition (98.15%) 
compared to the small unit condition (78.95%, β = -1.32, z = -2.50, p < .05). However, 
when the tablet was utilitarian, there was no significant difference in patience between 
the large unit (84.48%) and the small unit conditions (87.04%, β = .10, z = .39, p > .5; see 
figure 6.1). Hence, for the hedonic tablet, participants were more patient when the delay 
was described as 4 months, as opposed to 120 days, but this pattern did not extend to the 
utilitarian tablet.  
 
Discussion 
 
In a choice context, this study provides support for H1. I had presented 
participants with a choice between the current version of a computer tablet vs. a new and 
improved version of the tablet which was to release after a certain period of time. I had 
also manipulated the tablet to be either hedonic in nature or utilitarian. For the hedonic 
tablet, participants were more patient for the newer version when the wait time for it was 
expressed in terms of large (vs. small) units. For the utilitarian tablet, participants were 
equally patient in the large and small time unit conditions. Thus, participants were 
influenced by a change in time units (in line with the numerosity heuristic) when the 
rewards were hedonic, but not when they were utilitarian.  
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6.2 STUDY 2 
 
Having found evidence for my predicted effect in study 1, in this study I sought to 
establish whether time units and reward type can interact to influence patience in a 
consequential choice involving real money (a bonus payment to mTurk participants). 
That is, I now test H1 in a real choice scenario. I also used different units of time than in 
study 1, and a shorter objective wait time. Also, in study 1, I had changed the nature of 
the reward (i.e., tablet) to make it seem hedonic versus utilitarian. Now, I keep the reward 
(i.e., amount of money) constant, and ask participants to think of hedonic versus 
utilitarian products that they can purchase with money. The choice participants make is 
whether to receive a small monetary bonus sooner, or a large monetary bonus later. I 
predict that participants will be more patient for the larger bonus when the time unit is 
large (vs. small), provided they think of money as a means to acquire hedonic products. 
 
Method 
 
One hundred and forty six respondents from the mTurk online panel (Mage = 
33.57, female = 42.5%) successfully participated in the study (four responses were 
excluded because participants incorrectly answered the attention-filter question described 
in study 1). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in accordance with a 2 
(time unit: small, large) X 2 (reward type: hedonic, utilitarian) between subjects design. 
They were first made to think of hedonic versus utilitarian products that can be bought 
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with money. In the hedonic [utilitarian] condition, participants engaged in the following 
task: 
“Money can be spent on many different products. We want you to think 
about all the fun products that you can buy with money. For example, 
think about products that can bring you sensory pleasure, or products that 
can be used for your enjoyment. [We want you to think about all the 
useful products that you can buy with money. For example, think about 
products that are functional, or products that can be used to accomplish a 
practical task.] Below, please write down the names of three fun [useful] 
products that you can buy with money.” 
After participants completed the task, they moved on to the next section of the 
study. In this section they were informed that they have the opportunity to receive a 
bonus payment for completing the study (in addition to their regular payment of 30 
cents). In the small [large] time unit condition, they were presented with the following 
two options for their bonus payment: 
Option A: Receive a $25 bonus in 48 hours [2 days] 
Option B: Receive a $30 bonus in 96 hours [4 days] 
Participants were told that one randomly selected participant will receive the 
bonus that they choose. After choosing between the two options, they answered a 
manipulation check for the hedonic versus utilitarian manipulation. Specifically, they 
indicated the extent to which they were thinking about using money to buy something fun 
rather than useful (0 = ‘something useful’ and 100 = ‘something fun’). Finally, 
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participants answered standard demographic questions and the attention-filter question. 
One randomly selected participant was then paid the bonus according to what they had 
chosen. 
 
Results 
 
Check for hedonic-utilitarian manipulation. A 2-way ANOVA confirmed that the 
manipulation worked. There was a significant main effect of reward type; participants 
indicated that they were thinking about buying something hedonic relatively more in the 
hedonic condition (MHedonic = 33.46) than in the utilitarian condition (MUtilitarian = 25.44; 
F(1, 142) = 5.23, p < .05). There was no significant main effect of time unit, and no 
significant interaction (ps > .1) 
Choice. I conducted a binary logistic regression with time unit (large = -1, small = 
1) and reward type (hedonic = -1, utilitarian = 1) as the independent variables and choice 
(smaller sooner bonus = 0, larger later bonus = 1) as the dependent variable. A marginally 
significant 2-way interaction emerged between time unit and reward type (β = .43, z = 
1.77, p = .07). The main effect of time unit was significant (β = -.57, z = -2.33, p < .05), 
while that of reward type was not (β = .13, z = .54, p > .10). As predicted, participants in 
the hedonic condition chose the LL bonus significantly more when the time unit was 
large (92.5%) versus small (62.5%, β = -1.00, z = -2.85, p < .01). However, in the 
utilitarian condition, there was no significant difference in the large (87.10%) versus the 
small time unit condition (83.72%, β = -.14, z = -.40, p > .6; see figure 6.2). Hence, 
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participants were more patient for the larger-later bonus when the delay was described as 
4 days as opposed to 96 hours, but only when thoughts about the purchase of hedonic (vs. 
utilitarian) rewards were activated. 
 
Discussion 
 
This study builds on the findings of study 1 by replicating my predicted effect 
when the rewards pertained to real rather than hypothetical rewards. Thus, I was able to 
show that H1 holds for real choices as well. I first manipulated participants to view 
money as either a means to acquire hedonic rewards or utilitarian rewards. Then, I 
presented participants with a choice between a smaller monetary amount which was 
available sooner and a larger monetary amount which was available later. The choice had 
real consequences, since participants had a chance of receiving the option that they chose. 
Participants were found to be more patient when the wait times were expressed in large 
(vs. small) units of time, but only when money was seen as a means to acquire hedonic, 
rather than utilitarian rewards.  
I found these results when participants were told that they have a chance of 
winning the reward that they choose. To ensure that my effects replicate even when 
everyone has a 100% chance of receiving the reward they choose, I conducted a follow 
up study. In this study, one hundred and twenty three respondents from the mTurk online 
panel (Mage = 32, female = 39%) went through a similar procedure as in study 2, but the 
SS was a 20 cent bonus available immediately while the LL was a 30 cent bonus 
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available in 2 weeks. In the small time unit condition the wait time for LL was described 
as 14 days instead. All participants were guaranteed to receive the bonus that they chose. 
My results replicated. A significant 2-way interaction emerged between time unit and 
reward type (β = .38, z = 2.10, p < .05). Participants in the hedonic condition chose the 
LL bonus significantly more when the time unit was large (65.52%) versus small 
(38.71%, β = -.55, z = -2.05, p < .05). However, in the utilitarian condition, there was no 
significant difference in the large (45.45%) versus the small time unit condition (56.67%, 
β = .23, z = .89, p > .3). Hence, whether participants only had a chance of receiving their 
chosen reward, or were guaranteed to receive their chosen reward, patience for a larger 
later monetary reward increased when a larger time unit was used to describe the wait 
time. 
 
6.3 STUDY 3 
 
Having found evidence for H1 in studies 1and 2 using both hypothetical and real 
choices, the objective of this study is to build upon these findings in three ways. First, I 
seek to extend the effect from choices (studies 1 and 2) to participants’ subjective 
preference between the SS and LL options. Second, rather than inducing participants to 
think about spending money on buying hedonic versus utilitarian products (study 2), I 
measure the extent to which participants are, on their own, inclined to spend their money 
on hedonic versus utilitarian products. Lastly, I now test H2. I measure participants’ 
perception of wait time to establish that, consistent with the numerosity heuristic, it is the 
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shrinking of wait time that mediates the effect of larger units boosting patience.  
 
Method 
 
Two hundred and thirteen undergraduate students (Mage = 21, female = 44.1%) 
successfully participated in the study (eight responses were excluded because participants 
incorrectly answered the attention-filter question). I employed a study design in which 
one variable was manipulated (time unit: large, small) and another one was measured 
(reward type: hedonic, utilitarian). Participants were told the following: 
“Imagine that you have just won a $100 Visa gift card as a prize. We 
would like to know what kind of goods you would spend the money on. 
So please take a moment to think about what you would spend the money 
on.” 
On the next screen, participants randomly assigned to the small [large] 
time unit condition read the following: 
“Now imagine that you were offered the following deal: If you wait for 14 
days [2 weeks] before receiving your prize, you can get a $110 Visa gift 
card instead of a $100 Visa gift card.” 
All participants then indicated their preference between the two gift cards on a 0 
to 100 slider scale with 0 = ‘$100 card now’ and 100 = ‘$110 card later’. Participants 
were then asked the following question to measure time perception: “How long did the 
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wait time for the $110 card feel?”  (0 = very short, 100 = very long). To measure whether 
participants intended to use the money for something hedonic rather than utilitarian, they 
were asked: “When you thought about whether or not to wait for the $110 card, did you 
think about using the money you won for something useful or something fun?” (0 = 
something useful, 100 = something fun). Finally, participants answered standard 
demographic questions and the attention-filter question. 
 
Results  
 
Preference. To investigate the 2-way interaction between time unit (large = -1, 
small = 1) and reward type (hedonic vs. utilitarian; continuous), I used the Johnson-
Neyman floodlight analysis technique (Johnson and Neyman 1936; Spiller et al. 2013). 
The 2-way interaction with preference as the dependent variable was significant (β = -.18, 
t = -1.98, p < .05; figure 6.3.1). The main effect of time unit was not significant (β = 7.55, 
t = 1.24, p > .10), while that of reward type was significant (β = -.19, t = -2.11, p < .05). 
As predicted, for participants leaning toward using the money for something hedonic 
(who were at, or higher than, .46 SD above the mean on the useful-fun scale), preference 
to wait for the $110 card was significantly higher in the large unit condition compared to 
the small unit condition (βJN = -5.69, p = .05). For those leaning toward spending on 
something utilitarian, there was no significant difference between the large and small 
time unit conditions in their preference to wait for the $110 card (no Johnson-Neyman 
significance region). 
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Mediation. The pattern of results for the proposed mediator, wait time perception, 
was similar to what I observed for the preference measure. Specifically, a significant 2-
way interaction emerged between time unit and reward type (β = .16, t = 2.47, p < .05; 
figure 6.3.2). The main effect of time unit was not significant (β = -4.62, t = -1.08, p > 
.10), while that of reward type was significant (β = .16, t = 2.52, p < .05). As predicted, 
for participants leaning toward using the money for something hedonic (who were at, or 
higher than, .25 SD below the mean on the useful-fun scale), the wait time felt much 
shorter in the large (vs. small) unit condition (βJN = 3.76, p = .05). However, for those 
leaning toward spending on something utilitarian, there was no significant difference 
between the large and small time unit conditions (no Johnson-Neyman significance 
region). 
To explore if, in fact, time perception was responsible for the interactive effect of 
time units and reward type on preference, I ran a mediation analysis using the PROCESS 
SPSS macro (Model 8; Preacher and Hayes 2004; Hayes 2013). In the regression model, 
the dependent variable was preference while the independent variables were time unit 
(large vs small), reward type (hedonic vs. utilitarian), time unit x reward type, and time 
perception (how long did the wait time feel). The effect of the mediator, time perception, 
was significant (β = -.99, t = -13.96, p < .001). The interactive effect of time unit and 
reward type was not significant (β = -.02, t = -.36, p > .6). A bootstrap analysis showed 
that the indirect effect of the highest order interaction with time perception as the 
mediator was significant (β = -.16, 95% CI = -.30 to -0.03). Thus, these results confirm 
that time perception mediated the effect on preference. 
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Discussion 
 
Once again I observed evidence for H1. Complementing the choice results 
observed in the first two studies, the current study established the interactive effect of 
time units and reward type on preference for a larger later reward. I measured 
participants’ preference between two gift cards of monetary value that were separated by 
a wait time. Participants showed greater preference for the larger-later gift card over the 
smaller-sooner gift card when the wait time was expressed in large (vs. small units). But 
this effect only happened when they thought about using the money from the gift card 
towards something hedonic rather than utilitarian. 
 This study also augments my earlier findings by demonstrating that my results 
replicate even when I rely on participants’ natural inclinations toward spending on 
hedonic versus utilitarian products (i.e., when I measure rather than manipulate the 
reward). Finally, I find evidence for H2 by showing that my process chain is consistent 
with my theorizing about reliance on the numerosity heuristic when the rewards are 
hedonic: Large (vs. small) units shrink wait time perception and boost patience. 
 
6.4 STUDY 4 
 
Choosing a shipping speed represents an intertemporal choice. Consumers must 
decide between an SS option (pay more for expedited shipping; get product sooner) and 
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an LL option (pay less for standard shipping; get product later). In the current study, 
participants imagine purchasing a pair of headphones online. After the headphones are 
manipulated to have either a hedonic or utilitarian purpose, participants choose between 
standard and expedited shipping.  
This study denotes a departure from my previous studies in which a larger benefit 
was associated with the LL rather than the SS option (i.e., better version of tablet, or 
more money). In the current study, I examine whether my results replicate when I keep 
the benefits identical in the SS and LL options (i.e., the same pair of headphones) but 
introduce a higher cost associated with the SS relative to the LL option (i.e., more 
expensive product shipping). Hence, I once again test H1 and H2, but now in a different 
type of intertemporal choice. 
 
Method 
 
Two hundred and thirty four undergraduate students (Mage = 21, female = 61%) 
successfully participated in the study (six responses were excluded because participants 
incorrectly answered the attention-filter question). Participants were randomly assigned 
to conditions in accordance with a 2 (time unit: small, large) X 2 (reward type: hedonic, 
utilitarian) between subjects design. Participants in the hedonic [utilitarian] condition 
read the following scenario:  
“Imagine that you are shopping online for a pair of headphones. You are 
looking for a pair that would be fun to use, and offer good clarity of 
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musical notes [that would function reliably, and offer good clarity of 
voice]. Your goal is to have a pleasurable experience when listening to 
your preferred music over the Internet (when using Pandora and similar 
services) [Your goal is to have an effective conversation when 
interviewing for your preferred jobs over the internet (when using Skype 
and similar services)]. You find a good pair available for $40. You then 
head on over to the checkout page where you are presented with a couple 
of shipping options.”  
Participants were then informed that they had two shipping options for their 
headphones: Expedited for $4 or standard for $2. In the large (small) unit condition, 
standard shipping was said to take 3 days (72 hours) and expedited shipping to take 1 day 
(24 hours). Participants made a choice and then answered the question: “How long did 
the time period between now and the time at which you would receive your headphones 
through standard shipping feel?” They provided their answers on a 0-100 scale with 0 = 
very short and 100 = very long. Finally, participants answered a manipulation check for 
the hedonic versus utilitarian manipulation (as in study 1), standard demographic 
questions, and the attention-filter question.  
 
Results  
 
Check for hedonic-utilitarian manipulation. A 2-way ANOVA confirmed that the 
manipulation worked. There was a significant main effect of reward type such that 
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participants rated the headphones to be more hedonic in the hedonic condition (MHedonic = 
84.49) than in the utilitarian condition (MUtilitarian = 54.72; F(1, 230) = 90.2, p < .001). 
There was no significant main effect of time unit, and no significant interaction (ps > .1) 
Choice. I first conducted a binary logistic regression with time unit (large = -1, 
small = 1) and reward type (hedonic = -1, utilitarian = 1) as the independent variables and 
shipping choice (expedited = 0, standard = 1) as the dependent variable. A significant 2-
way interaction emerged between time unit and reward type (β = .26, z = 2.00, p < .05; 
figure 6.4.1). The main effect of time unit was not significant (β = -.22, z = -1.66, p = 
.10), while that of reward type was also not significant (β = .05, z = .34, p > .10). As 
predicted, when the headphones were hedonic, participants chose to go with standard 
shipping significantly more in the large unit condition (62.50%) compared to the small 
unit condition (38.60%, β = -.49, z = -2.52, p < .05). Hence, participants were more 
patient for the hedonic headphones when the delay was described in the larger unit of 
days, as opposed to hours. However, when the headphones were utilitarian, there was no 
significant difference in participants’ choice of standard shipping between the large 
(51.72%) and small unit conditions (53.97%, β = .05, z = .25, p > .7).  
Mediation. The pattern of results for the proposed mediator, wait time perception 
for the later option (i.e., standard shipping), was similar to what I observed for the choice 
measure. Specifically, a significant 2-way interaction emerged between time unit and 
reward type (β = -3.94, t = -2.40, p < .05; figure 6.4.2). The main effect of time unit was 
not significant (β = 2.57, t = 1.57, p > .10), while that of reward type was also not 
significant (β = -1.62, t = -.99, p > .10). As predicted, in the hedonic condition, subjects 
thought standard shipping would take significantly shorter when the time unit used was 
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large (MDays = 27.88) rather than small (MHours = 40.89, β = 6.51, t = 2.76, p < .01). In the 
utilitarian condition, there was no significant difference (MDays = 32.50, MHours = 29.78, β 
= -1.36, t = -.59, p > .5). 
To explore if, in fact, time perception was responsible for the effect on choice, I 
ran a mediation analysis using the PROCESS SPSS macro (Model 8; Preacher and Hayes 
2004; Hayes 2013). In the regression model, the dependent variable was choice while the 
independent variables were time unit (large vs small), reward type (hedonic vs. 
utilitarian), time unit x reward type, and time perception (how long standard shipping 
seemed to take). The effect of the mediator, time perception, was significant (β = -.04, z 
= -5.94, p < .01). The interactive effect of time unit and reward type was not significant 
(β = .16, z = 1.08, p > .2). A bootstrap analysis showed that the indirect effect of the 
highest order interaction with time perception as the mediator was significant (β = .32, 
95% CI = .06 to .66). Thus, these results confirm that time perception mediated the effect 
on choice. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 4 provides further evidence for H1 and H2 by replicating the results from 
studies 1, 2 and 3 in a different intertemporal choice scenario (i.e., product shipping) in 
which the product remains the same across the SS and LL options. I had provided 
participants with two shipping options for a pair of headphones: expedited shipping 
(which was more expensive but faster) and standard shipping (which was cheaper but 
slower). Choosing standard over expedited shipping reflects more patience, since 
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participants would be waiting longer in exchange for paying less. The headphones, other 
than being manipulated to be either hedonic or utilitarian, were exactly the same. 
Providing evidence for the robustness of my effect, the results remained the same even in 
this kind of intertemporal choice: Larger time units boosted patience in the hedonic 
condition, but not the utilitarian condition. Finally, mirroring study 3, the current study 
established mediation via wait time perception. 
 
6.5 STUDY 5 
 
Studies 1 to 4 provide robust evidence for my predicted interaction. In addition, 
studies 3 and 4 provide evidence for my proposed process by showing that the effect of 
units on patience is mediated via wait time perception. In study 5, I now test H3. That is, 
I seek evidence for my proposed theory about the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry being 
driven by hedonic rewards leading individuals to use a less calculative mindset when 
evaluating an intertemporal choice. If my theory is valid, my proposed effect should be 
moderated by reliance on calculation. Specifically, when individuals are chronically more 
likely to be calculative, the effect of units in the case of hedonic rewards should diminish. 
In other words, a calculative mindset should eliminate the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry.  
I use Hsee et al. (2015)’s Lay Rationalism Scale in order to differentiate between 
participants who are more naturally inclined to use greater vs. lesser calculation when 
making decisions. Hsee et al. (2015) define Lay Rationalism as an individual difference 
variable which measures the extent to which individuals use reason vs. feelings to guide 
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their decision making. Higher scores on Lay Rationalism reflect greater use of reason, 
such as a greater tendency to do a careful cost-benefit analysis based on objective facts. 
In line with H3, I predict that the interactive effect of hedonic vs. utilitarian rewards and 
large vs. small time units should diminish among individuals high on Lay Rationalism, as 
these individuals will be using a more calculative mindset in their decision making even 
when rewards are hedonic. 
 
Method 
 
Two hundred and ninety respondents from the mTurk online panel (Mage = 35.84, 
female = 44.6%) successfully participated in the study (ten responses were excluded 
because participants incorrectly answered the attention-filter question as described in 
study 1).   
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in accordance with a 2 (time 
unit: small, large) X 2 (reward type: hedonic, utilitarian) X 2 (lay rationalism: low, high; 
measured) between-subjects design. Participants were first made to think of hedonic 
versus utilitarian products that can be bought with money, using the same procedure as in 
Study 2. After participants completed the task, they moved on to the next section of the 
study, where those in the small [large] time unit condition were asked to read the 
following scenario: 
“In order to reward you for being a loyal customer, an online retailer 
wants to offer you a free gift card. You can use this gift card on their site 
44 
 
towards the purchase of any of their wide selection of goods. The retailer 
has given you two options to choose from: 
Option A: Receive a $100 gift card in 14 days [2 weeks] 
Option B: Receive a $120 gift card in 56 days [8 weeks]”  
All participants then indicated their preference between the two gift cards on a 0 
to 100 slider scale with 0 = ‘$100 gift card’ and 100 = ‘$120 gift card’. Participants were 
then asked the following question to measure time perception: “How long did the wait 
time for the $120 card feel?”  (0 = very short, 100 = very long). After choosing between 
the two options, participants then completed the six-item Lay Rationalism Scale (Hsee et 
al. 2015). Finally, participants answered a manipulation check for the hedonic versus 
utilitarian manipulation just as in Study 2 and answered standard demographic questions 
and the attention-filter question.  
 
Results  
 
 Check on Lay Rationalism. First, I wanted to check if the measured variable of lay 
rationalism was influenced by the manipulations used in this study. Thus, I ran a 
regression with lay rationalism as the dependent variable and reward type (hedonic = -1, 
utilitarian = 1) and time unit (large = -1, small = 1) as the independent variables. The 2-
way interaction between reward type and time unit was not significant (β = .05, t = .94, p 
> .10). The main effect of reward type was not significant (β = .08, t = 1.47, p > .10), 
while that of time unit was also not significant (β = .07, t = 1.30, p > .10). Thus, 
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participants’ responses to the lay rationalism scale were not significantly influenced by 
either the reward type or time unit manipulation. 
Preference. Using the dependent variable of preference, I conducted a regression 
with reward type (hedonic = -1, utilitarian = 1), time unit (large = -1, small = 1) and lay 
rationalism as the independent variables. A significant 2-way interaction emerged 
between reward type and time unit (β = 4.70, t = 2.04, p < .05; figure 6.5.1) and a 
marginally significant 3-way interaction emerged between reward type, time unit, and lay 
rationalism (β = -4.09, t = -1.67, p = .09; figure 6.5.2). The main effect of reward type 
was not significant (β = -3.45, t = -.27, p > .10), while that of time unit was significant (β 
= -27.83, t = -2.14, p < .05). There was a significant main effect of lay rationalism (β = 
10.59, t = 4.32, p < .05). 
First, the 2-way interaction reported above was as I predicted, and consistent with 
my earlier studies. As is clear from the pattern (figure 6.5.1), participants in the hedonic 
condition preferred the LL gift card significantly more when the time unit was large 
(MWeeks = 55.13) versus small (MDays = 36.17, β = -9.48, t = -2.87, p < .01). However, in 
the utilitarian condition, there was no significant difference in the large (MWeeks = 47.42) 
versus the small time unit condition (MDays = 47.28, β = -.07, t = -.02, p > .9). Hence, 
participants were more patient for the larger-later gift card when the delay was described 
as 8 weeks as opposed to 56 days, but only when thoughts about the purchase of hedonic 
(vs. utilitarian) rewards were activated. 
Next, to investigate the 3-way interaction, I used the Johnson-Neyman floodlight 
analysis technique (Johnson and Neyman 1936, Spiller et al. 2013). The 2-way 
46 
 
interaction between reward type and time unit was only significant for those who scored 
relatively low on lay rationalism—who were at or below 0.19SD below the mean on the 
lay rationalism scale (βJN = 4.49, t = 1.97, p = 0.05). To further explore these results, I 
examined the 2-way interaction at 1 SD below and above the mean of the lay rationalism 
scale (see figure 6.5.2). 
At 1SD below the mean of lay rationalism, the 2-way interaction was significant 
(β = 7.56, t = 2.38, p < .05; figure 6.5.2, panel A). Participants in the hedonic condition 
preferred the LL gift card significantly more when the time unit was large (MWeeks = 
53.89) versus small (MDays = 20.30, β = -16.79, t = -3.81, p < .001). However, in the 
utilitarian condition, there was no significant difference in the large (MWeeks = 37.66) 
versus the small time unit condition (MDays = 34.31, β = -1.68, t = -.37, p > .6). Thus, 
participants were more patient for the larger-later gift card when the delay was described 
as 8 weeks as opposed to 56 days, but only when thoughts about the purchase of hedonic 
(vs. utilitarian) rewards were activated. However, at 1SD above the mean of lay 
rationalism, the 2-way interaction was not significant (β = -.05, t = -.02, p > .9; figure 
6.5.2, panel B). Thus, for those using more rationalism (calculation) in their decision 
making, the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry was no longer present. 
Mediation. The pattern of results for the proposed mediator, wait time perception, 
was similar to what I observed for the preference measure. Specifically, when using 
reward type (hedonic = -1, utilitarian = 1), time unit (large = -1, small = 1) and lay 
rationalism as the independent variables, the 2-way interaction between reward type and 
time unit was marginally significant (β = -3.33, t = -1.89, p = .06; figure 6.5.3), and the 3-
way interaction between reward type, time unit and lay rationalism was significant (β = 
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4.48, t = 2.34, p < .05; figure 6.5.4). The main effect of reward type was not significant (β 
= 8.36, t = .82, p > .10), while that of time unit was also not significant (β = 7.62, t = .75, 
p > .10). There was a significant main effect of lay rationalism (β = -3.91, t = -2.04, p < 
.05). 
In the 2-way interaction between reward type and time unit, participants in the 
hedonic condition felt the wait time to be marginally significantly shorter when the time 
unit was large (MWeeks = 57.19) versus small (MDays = 66.56, β = 4.68, t = 1.86, p = .06). 
However, in the utilitarian condition, there was no significant difference in the large 
(MWeeks = 64.81) versus the small time unit condition (MDays = 60.84, β = -1.98, t = -.80, p 
> .4). Hence, participants felt the wait time for the larger gift card was shorter when the 
delay was described as 8 weeks as opposed to 56 days, but only when thoughts about the 
purchase of hedonic (vs. utilitarian) rewards were activated.  
Next, to investigate the 3-way interaction, I used the Johnson-Neyman floodlight 
analysis technique (Johnson and Neyman 1936, Spiller et al. 2013). The 2-way 
interaction between reward type and time unit was only significant for those who scored 
relatively low on lay rationalism—who were at or below 0.14SD below the mean on the 
lay rationalism scale (βJN = -3.49, t = -1.97, p = 0.05). To further explore these results, I 
examined the 2-way interaction at 1 SD below and above the mean of the lay rationalism 
scale (see figure 6.5D). 
At 1SD below the mean of lay rationalism, the 2-way interaction was significant 
(β = -7.08, t = -2.86, p < .01; figure 6.5.4, panel A). Participants in the hedonic condition 
felt that the wait time for the LL gift card was shorter when the time unit was large 
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(MWeeks = 54.49) versus small (MDays = 73.57, β = 9.54, t = 2.77, p < .01). However, in the 
utilitarian condition, there was no significant difference in the large (MWeeks = 72.50) 
versus the small time unit condition (MDays = 63.24, β = -4.63, t = -1.30, p > .1). Thus, 
participants felt the wait time was shorter when it was described as 8 weeks as opposed to 
56 days, but only when thoughts about the purchase of hedonic (vs. utilitarian) rewards 
were activated. However, at 1SD above the mean of lay rationalism, the 2-way 
interaction was not significant (β = 1.25, t = .50, p > .6; figure 6.5.4, panel B). Thus, for 
those using more rationalism (calculation) in their decision making, the hedonic-
utilitarian asymmetry was no longer present. 
To explore if, in fact, time perception was responsible for the effect on preference 
in the 3-way interaction between reward type, time unit and lay rationalism, I ran a 
mediation analysis using the PROCESS SPSS macro (Model 12; Preacher and Hayes 
2004; Hayes 2013). In the regression model, the dependent variable was preference while 
the independent variables were time unit (large vs small), reward type (hedonic vs. 
utilitarian), lay rationalism, the interactions between these variables, and time perception 
(how long did the wait time feel). The effect of the mediator, time perception, was 
significant (β = -.59, z = -8.72, p < .0001). The interactive effect between time unit, 
reward type and lay rationalism was not significant (β = -1.45, t = -.66, p = .51). Most 
importantly, a bootstrap analysis confirmed a significant indirect effect of the highest 
order interaction with time perception as the mediator (β = -2.65, 95% CI = -5.37 to -
0.30).   
Taken together with the results reported earlier, the results from the mediation 
analysis confirm that time perception mediated the effect on preference. When lay 
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rationalism was low, the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry was present for both time 
perception and preference. However, when lay rationalism was high, the hedonic-
utilitarian asymmetry was eliminated for both time perception and preference. And as 
confirmed in the mediation analysis, the indirect effect of the highest order interaction 
(i.e., the interaction between reward type, time unit and lay rationalism) through time 
perception on preference was significant. 
 
Discussion 
 
In this study, I found evidence for H3. I had looked to find evidence for my 
proposed process through moderation. I had predicted in H3 that participants who are 
naturally more inclined to be calculative in their decision making would show a weak 
effect of units on patience, even when the rewards are hedonic. Hence, in study 5, I 
measured individual tendency to use a lesser vs. greater calculative mindset in decisions, 
i.e., those low vs. high on lay rationalism respectively, and I found that those who use a 
calculative mindset to a lesser degree demonstrate an interactive effect between time unit 
and reward types such that time units have an effect on time perception and consequently 
patience when rewards are hedonic, but less so when utilitarian. However, for those who 
use a calculative mindset to a greater degree, this interaction is no longer significant. I 
also observed mediation via wait time perception, just as I did in studies 3 and 4. Hence, 
the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry did not emerge for individuals who have a tendency to 
use a more calculative mindset in decision making.  
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6.6 STUDY 6 
 
In study 6, my objective was to provide further evidence for H3. Whereas in study 
5 I measured individual tendency to be more vs. less calculative in decisions, in study 6, I 
now induce a calculative mindset. In line with H3, I expect that for individuals who have 
been primed to rely on calculation, the interactive effect of time units and reward type on 
patience will diminish. That is, even for hedonic rewards, the effect of units on patience 
should diminish when individuals are in a more calculative mindset.   
 
Method 
 
One hundred and eighty five undergraduate students (Mage = 20, female = 61%) 
successfully participated in the study (seven responses were excluded because 
participants incorrectly answered the attention-filter question as described in study 1).   
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in accordance with a 2 (time 
unit: small, large) X 2 (reward type: hedonic, utilitarian) X 2 (reliance on calculation: 
control, calculation prime) between-subjects design. Those in the calculation prime 
condition first answered five questions that required performing calculations (Hsee and 
Rottenstreich 2004). For example, one of the questions was: “If a consumer bought 30 
books for $540, then, by your calculations, on average, how much did the consumer pay 
for each book?” Participants in the control condition did not complete this task. All 
participants then read the headphone scenario that we employed in study 4, and followed 
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the same procedure. 
 
Results  
 
 Choice. Using the dependent variable of shipping choice (expedited = 0, standard 
= 1), I conducted a binary logistic regression with reward type (hedonic = -1, utilitarian = 
1), time unit (large = -1, small = 1) and reliance on calculation (control = -1, calculation 
prime = 1) as the independent variables. There was no significant main effect of either 
reward type (β = .09, z = .57, p > .10) or time unit (β = .002, z = .01, p > .10), while that 
of reliance on calculation was marginally significant (β = -.30, z = -1.82, p = .07). 
Importantly, the 3-way interaction between reward type, time units, and reliance on 
calculation (β = -.31, z = -1.86, p = .06; figure 6.6.1) pointed toward the predicted pattern 
of results.  
In the control condition, the 2-way interaction between reward type and time unit 
was significant (β = .60, z = 2.36, p < .05). The specific patterns were just as I observed 
in earlier studies. When the headphones were hedonic, participants opted for standard 
shipping significantly more in the large unit condition (78.95%) compared to the small 
unit condition (42.86%, β = -.80, z = -2.06, p < .05). But when the headphones were 
utilitarian, there was no significant difference in participants’ choice of standard shipping 
between the large (70.37%) and small unit conditions (83.87%, β = .39, z = 1.21, p > .2; 
figure 6.6.1). That is, in the control condition, hedonic (but not utilitarian) headphones 
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led to more patience when the delay was described in days (vs. hours) because of a 
reliance on heuristics rather than systematic calculations. 
In the calculation prime condition, the 2-way interaction between reward type and 
wait time was not significant (β = -.02, z = -.11, p > .8). This confirmed my proposed 
process, such that a calculative mindset erased the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry; 
participants in the hedonic condition were now behaving just as participants in the 
utilitarian condition already were.   
Mediation. The pattern of results for the proposed mediator, wait time perception, 
was similar to what I observed for the choice measure. I conducted a regression using 
reward type (hedonic = -1, utilitarian = 1), time unit (large = -1, small = 1) and reliance 
on calculation (control = -1, present = 1) as the independent variables. There was no 
significant main effect of either reward type (β = -2.96, t = -1.53, p > .10) or time unit (β 
= 1.69, t = .88, p > .10), while that of reliance on calculation was marginally significant 
(β = 3.31, t = 1.71, p = .09).  Importantly, the 3-way interaction between reward type, 
time unit and reliance on calculation (β = 4.50, t = 2.32, p < .05; figure 6.6.2) pointed 
toward the predicted pattern of results. In the control condition, the 2-way interaction 
between reward type and time unit was significant (β = -5.39, t = -1.95, p = .05). As 
predicted, when the headphones were hedonic, wait time for standard shipping seemed 
shorter when the time unit was large (MDays = 41.68) rather than small (MHours = 59.71, β 
= 9.01, t = 2.03, p < .05); when the headphones were utilitarian, there was no significant 
difference (MDays = 31.77, MHours = 35.29, β = -1.76, t = -.53, p > .5). However, the 2-way 
interaction between reward type and wait time was not significant in the calculation 
prime condition (β = 3.61, t = 1.33, p > .10). 
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To explore if, in fact, time perception was responsible for the effect on choice in 
the 3-way interaction between reward type, time unit and reliance on caclculation, I ran a 
mediation analysis using the PROCESS SPSS macro (Model 12; Preacher and Hayes 
2004; Hayes 2013). In the regression model, the dependent variable was choice while the 
independent variables were time unit (large vs. small), reward type (hedonic vs. 
utilitarian), reliance on calculation (control vs. calculation prime), the interactions 
between these variables, and time perception (how long standard shipping would take). 
The effect of the mediator, time perception, was significant (β = -.05, z = -5.28, p < 
.001). The interactive effect of time unit, reward type and reliance on calculation was not 
significant (β = -.19, z = -1.03, p > .3). Most importantly, a bootstrap analysis confirmed 
a significant indirect effect of the highest order interaction with time perception as the 
mediator (β = -.20, 95% CI = -.48 to -.02).  
Taken together with the results reported earlier, the results from the mediation 
analysis confirm that time perception mediated the effect on choice. In the control 
condition, the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry was present for both time perception and 
choice. However, in the calculation prime condition, the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry 
was eliminated for both time perception and choice. And as confirmed in the mediation 
analysis, the indirect effect of the highest order interaction (i.e., the interaction between 
reward type, time unit and reliance on calculation) through time perception on preference 
was significant. 
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Discussion 
 
The control condition of the current study replicated the interactive effect on 
patience that I observed in the earlier studies. I used the exact same scenario as in study 
4, and replicated the effect in the control condition. I also observed mediation via wait 
time perception, just as I did in studies 3, 4 and 5. Importantly, the current study provided 
further process evidence for my theory via moderation, and in doing so found support for 
H3 once again. Consistent with the results from study 5, when participants were primed 
to rely on calculation, reliance on the numerosity heuristic was diminished. That is, even 
in the case of hedonic rewards, larger units did not influence wait time and patience. 
Consequently, the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry no longer emerged when participants 
were primed to rely on calculation in their decision making. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: % choosing to wait for superior version of tablet when it seems 
hedonic versus utilitarian (study 1) 
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Figure 6.2: % choosing to wait for the larger-later bonus payment in the hedonic 
versus utilitarian conditions (study 2) 
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Figure 6.3.1: Subjective preference for the larger-later monetary reward (means 
shown at +/-1 sd of fun vs. useful; study 3) 
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Figure 6.3.2: Wait time perception (means shown at +/-1 sd of fun vs. useful; 
study 3) 
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Figure 6.4.1: % choosing standard over expedited shipping when headphones 
seem hedonic versus utilitarian (study 4) 
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Figure 6.4.2: Subjective time perception when headphones seem hedonic versus 
utilitarian (study 4) 
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Figure 6.5.1: Subjective preference for the larger-later gift card (study 5) 
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Panel A: Low Lay Rationalism 
 
 
Panel B: High Lay Rationalism 
 
 
Figure 6.5.2: Subjective preference for the larger-later gift card (patterns for lay 
rationalism at +/-1 sd of the mean; study 5)  
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Figure 6.5.3: Wait time perception (study 5) 
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Panel A: Low Lay Rationalism 
 
 
Panel B: High Lay Rationalism 
 
 
Figure 6.5.4: Wait time perception (patterns for lay rationalism at +/-1 sd of the 
mean; study 5) 
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Panel A: Control 
 
 
 
Panel B: Calculation Prime 
 
 
Figure 6.6.1: % choosing standard over expedited shipping when headphones 
seem hedonic versus utilitarian (patterns for control vs. calculation prime; study 
6) 
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Panel A: Control
 
 
Panel B: Calculation Prime 
 
 
Figure 6.6.2: Subjective time perceptions when headphones seem hedonic versus 
utilitarian (patterns for control vs. calculation prime; study 6) 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Consumers often encounter a choice between a smaller reward that is available 
sooner (SS) and a larger reward that is available later in time (LL). In such intertemporal 
choice situations, patience is reflected by the willingness to forgo the SS reward and wait 
for the LL reward. These situations are reflected in every day decisions, such as deciding 
whether to spend money or save it, whether to buy a product now or wait for a better 
version, and whether or not to spend more money to get a product delivered sooner 
through faster shipping. Since the SS and LL rewards in such situations are separated by 
a wait time, the shorter this wait time feels, the more patient one becomes for the LL 
reward. In this dissertation, I investigate how expressing the wait time in different units 
of time can impact time perception, and consequently patience, and how the nature of the 
SS and LL rewards can determine whether this effect will occur. In doing so, I reveal a 
new antecedent of patience that involves the interactive effect of two defining aspects of 
an intertemporal choice: wait time and rewards.  
I argue that while numerosity effects would be expected to emerge in 
intertemporal choices, this may not always be the case. An intertemporal choice is a
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unique context that involves not only consideration of the wait time but also a 
comparison between SS and LL rewards. Thus, the nature of the rewards might determine 
whether decision makers rely more on careful calculation rather than quick heuristics 
such as numerosity. I theorize that utilitarian rather than hedonic rewards are more likely 
to lead to a reliance on calculation in decision making. Hence, I predict an interactive 
effect, such that larger (vs. smaller) time units shorten wait time perception and thereby 
boost patience, but more so when rewards are hedonic rather than utilitarian. Further, I 
also predict that this effect will be moderated by reliance on calculation. If the tendency 
to rely on calculation increases, the predicted asymmetry between hedonic and utilitarian 
rewards will diminish.  
Six studies reveal this interactive effect across several units of wait time, for 
choice and preference measures, for hypothetical and real rewards, and regardless of 
whether hedonic versus utilitarian perceptions are measured or manipulated. Mediation 
analyses in studies 3 to 6 also establish that my results are driven by wait time perception, 
just as the numerosity heuristic would predict. Studies 5 and 6 delineate a boundary 
condition for the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry, which is in line with my proposed 
underlying process. Specifically, my theory is built around the notion that utilitarian 
rather than hedonic rewards will lead to a more calculative mindset in intertemporal 
choice, which should lead to a lesser reliance on the numerosity heuristic, and hence 
diminish the effect of units on patience. In line with this theory, I show in study 5, that 
the effect of units neutralizes even for hedonic rewards for individuals with a natural 
tendency to be more calculative in their decisions. Similarly in study 6 I show that 
inducing a more calculative mindset also neutralizes the effect of units on patience when 
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rewards are hedonic. These diminished numerosity effects for hedonic rewards eliminate 
the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry. 
My studies relate to a number of consumer contexts in which consumers can 
either choose to receive immediate benefits, or exhibit patience and thereby receive better 
benefits in the future. Study 1 showed support for my predictions when participants were 
asked to choose between the current version of a computer tablet vs. an upcoming new 
version. Studies 2, 3 and 5 used monetary rewards instead, and provided support for my 
predictions even when participants were simply choosing between less money now vs. 
more money later. In studies 4 and 6, participants chose between standard and expedited 
shipping, and once again my predictions were supported. These results help to 
demonstrate that my hypothesized effects extend to a variety of decisions that consumers 
make every day in the marketplace. 
My results connect chiefly to three theoretical areas: intertemporal choice, 
numerosity, and hedonic-utilitarian differences. I next discuss the implications of my 
results for these three areas and present some new ideas for future research. I then 
conclude with implications for managers and public-policy makers. 
 
Implications for Research on Intertemporal Choice 
 
My results provided a detailed account of when a change in time units can impact 
time perception, and thereby patience, in intertemporal choice. Past research on 
intertemporal choice, which has peripherally explored this issue (e.g., LeBoeuf 2006, 
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Read et al. 2005), has not found any significant effects of units on patience. I believe that 
the lack of significant results found in this work might have been due to their use of 
money as the SS and LL rewards. As my results demonstrate, the effect of units is heavily 
dependent on whether the nature of the rewards is hedonic or utilitarian. When rewards 
are utilitarain, the effect of using different time units on time perception and patience is 
weaker, as compared to when rewards are hedonic. Further, as studies 2, 3 and 5 
demonstrate, using different time units can also impact patience for purely monetary 
rewards, provided that individuals are viewing money as a means to more hedonic rather 
than utilitarian goods.  
In my investigation, I observe an interaction between the defining traits of an 
intertemporal choice setting: wait time and rewards. Showing that wait time units interact 
with the hedonic-utilitarian nature of rewards offers a novel lens to view intertemporal 
choice. It is already known that patience is affected by the nature of the rewards 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Thaler 1981). It is also known that patience is influenced 
by the perception of wait time (Zauberman et al. 2009). What I show is that the nature of 
the rewards influences the perception of wait time. By showing that a factor integral to 
intertemporal-choice settings—the nature of the rewards—can influence wait time 
perception, I also add to a stream of literature on the antecedents of wait time perception 
(Ebert and Prelec 2007; Kim, et al. 2012; Kim and Zauberman 2013; LeBoeuf 2006; May 
and Monga 2014; Read 2001; Read et al. 2005; Scholten and Read 2006; Zauberman et 
al. 2009). 
My results also provide new research opportunities. I considered standard 
intertemporal-choice settings in which waiting is aversive, and people want rewards 
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sooner rather than later. However, waiting may be pleasurable, such as when one savors 
the time spent waiting in anticipation of a kiss from a celebrity (Loewenstein 1987). For 
such fleeting and vivid experiences, the shrinking of wait time due to larger units may not 
be appreciated by individuals. One may prefer small units, which elongate time 
perception, so that savoring can be extended. My focus was on a choice between a sooner 
and a later option. Other situations involve choices between sequences. For instance, 
would one prefer to go to (a) a French dinner sooner and a Greek dinner on an evening a 
few days later or (b) a Greek dinner sooner and a French dinner later? People who prefer 
French food opt for the latter sequence, which is an improving one (i.e., better food later). 
However, this happens only when the two dinners are close enough in time, so that they 
are seen to be part of the same sequence (Loewenstein and Prelec 1993). My results 
suggest that time units may influence which sequence people prefer. Large units may 
make wait time seem short, resulting in a preference for an improving sequence (because 
the short wait time would make the events appear to be part of the same sequence). 
However, small units may make wait time seem long, leading to a preference for a 
declining sequence. That is, in the case of small units, the two dinners may not seem to be 
part of a sequence, and people may just prefer to have what they love (French food) 
sooner rather than later. 
 
Implications for Research on Numerosity 
 
 Numbers are a precise way to describe quantities and yet they can lead us astray. 
In particular, prior research suggests that individuals neglect the units of quantities, and 
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over-rely on the numbers. Consequently, larger units lead to smaller magnitude 
perceptions (Burson et al. 2009; Pandelaere et al. 2011; Pelham et al. 1994; Raghubir and 
Srivastava 2002; Shen and Urminsky 2013; Wertenbroch et al. 2007). I show that the 
numerosity heuristic emerges in intertemporal settings, but more so when rewards are 
hedonic.  
My results also offer new opportunities for research in this area. In particular, my 
exploration was limited to how numerosity effects are weaker for utilitarian rewards 
compared to hedonic rewards, and I showed that effects for hedonic rewards may be 
nullified by encouraging participants to be more calculative. What remains to be explored 
is how numerosity effects may be evoked for utilitarian rewards. Perhaps one way to do 
so would be to induce an affective mindset instead of a calculative mindset. That would 
again erase the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry, but instead of both hedonic and utilitarian 
conditions yielding a null effect (as I show), both conditions would likely reveal a 
numerosity effect. 
While past work on numerosity has shown numerosity effects for utilitarian 
products as well, such as when people evaluate the length of warranty periods for 
dishwashers (Pandelaere et al. 2011), I theorize that the hedonic-utilitiarian asymmetry I 
observe here is most likely due to the unique scenario an intertemporal choice presents. 
An intertemporal choice involving rewards is not a simple evaluation of magnitude, such 
as how much longer the length of a warranty period is for one product vs. the other, but a 
comparison between a smaller reward versus a larger one separated by wait time. As I 
discussed in my theorizing, it is due to the presence of this comparison between two 
rewards, and the assessment of whether it is worth enduring the wait time to receive the 
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larger reward, that can possibly lead individuals to be in a more calculative mindset when 
evaluating the wait time. Specifically, since the comparison between rewards can vary 
along utilitarian vs. hedonic properties, a more calculative mindset may be used in 
intertemporal choice. Future work could look at other scenarios where the decision 
situation leads people to use a more calculative mindset, and hence become relatively 
immune to numerosity effects, and other possible numerical biases.  
I observed numerosity results using a variety of different units (hours, weeks, 
days, and months), but did not consider very large units (years, decades, etc.). Future 
research could examine these additional units, and also how responses change depending 
on other factors that influence numerosity, such as the differential attention to units 
(Pandelaere et al. 2011; Shen and Urminksy 2013). Moreover, while numerosity is the 
default effect in most cases, and emerges even when concrete mindsets are induced, 
reversals may occur under abstract mindsets, or when personal relevance is high (Monga 
and Bagchi 2012; Ulkumen and Thomas 2013). Future research could examine how my 
numerosity results (in the case of hedonic rewards) replicate for larger units (e.g., years), 
and are influenced by variables such as abstract construals.  
 
Implications for Research on Hedonic-Utilitarian Differences 
 
Research on hedonic-utilitarian differences is extensive (Dhar and Wertenbroch 
2000; Hirschman and Holbrook 1982; Khan et al. 2005; Okada 2005; Pham 1998; 
Strahilevitz and Myers 1998). However, prior literature is silent on how such differences 
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may influence patience via wait time perception. Indeed, to my knowledge, there is no 
literature to connect hedonic-utilitarian differences to time perception. I show that wait 
time perception is more malleable in the context of hedonic rewards (i.e., perception 
changes more easily with time units), which has consequences for patience. There is 
research in other areas—affect dependence and guilt—that suggests pathways by which 
hedonic-utilitarian differences may influence patience, but those pathways are conflicting 
(Urminsky and Kivetz 2004). People may exhibit lower patience for hedonic (vs. 
utilitarian) goods because they are known to be more affect laden (Loewenstein 1996); or 
they may exhibit higher patience for hedonic goods because they are known to induce 
guilt and encourage people to exert self-control (Kivetz and Simonson 2002; 
Wertenbroch 1998). I do not contribute to this debate because my studies were not 
designed to compare the patience of hedonic versus utilitarian products. Indeed, my 
participants did not choose between hedonic and utilitarian options, but between two 
hedonic options, or two utilitarian options. However, a question that remains open is 
whether factors such as guilt may influence the hedonic-utilitarian asymmetry that I 
observe. 
In my theorizing, I had contended that hedonic (vs. utilitarian) rewards should 
lead to a relatively stronger effect of units on patience in intertemporal choice, since the 
affective nature of hedonic consumption leads to a decreased reliance on a calculative 
mindset. There is, however, the possibility that under certain circumstances affect 
intensity will in fact lead to an increased reliance on a calculative mindset. For example, 
in situations where one feels uncertain emotions, such as fear and surprise, individuals 
may actually engage in more careful processing of their decisions (Bless et al. 1996; 
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Bodenhausen 1994; Forgas 1998; Lerner and Tiedens 2006; Tiedens and Linton 2001). 
While the type of hedonic rewards I investigated are unlikely to lead to emotions that 
promote uncertainty, it would be interesting to investigate how numerosity effects may 
diminish under certain conditions where affect intensity takes the form of uncertain 
emotions.  
Future research could also examine the asymmetry between hedonic and 
utilitarian stimuli in domains outside of intertemporal choice. For instance, prior research 
has examined the influences on task-related durations, such as how long a task is 
perceived to take (Kanten 2011; Liberman et al. 2007; McCrea et al. 2008; Siddiqui, 
May, and Monga 2014). My results suggest that time perceptions may be shorter when 
hedonic tasks are framed using larger units (e.g., spending 1 evening at a party) versus 
smaller units (e.g., spending 5 hours at the party), but that units may not have an 
influence in the case of utilitarian tasks (e.g., spending 1 morning cleaning the garage vs. 
5 hours cleaning it). 
 
Implications for Managers and Public Policy 
 
 My research offers insights into how marketers of hedonic products could employ 
units of time. Consider video-game consoles that individuals often buy for fun rather than 
a functional purpose. A company trying to sell the remaining inventory of a current 
model before the release of the new model would want to communicate the time till the 
new release in small units. Wait time would seem long, and reduced patience would make 
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it more likely that consumers purchase the current model rather than wait for the new 
one. In contrast, if the company has just a few units of the current model left and is keen 
to shift consumer demand toward pre-ordering the new model, then using larger units 
would be more beneficial. This is because wait time would seem short, and increased 
patience would make it more likely that consumers bypass the current model and pre-
order the new one. Such strategies could also be employed for products that a marketer 
may be able to frame as either hedonic or utilitarian. Employing such framing (as I did in 
study 1) could have consequences for wait time and patience. 
 A similar strategy could also be applied for the online shipping of hedonic 
products. To garner the additional revenues of expedited shipping, a company may make 
consumers more impatient by using small units that would elongate the perception of 
wait time for standard shipping. However, if the company is running out of stock and 
would like to delay shipping, then using larger units would be helpful in shifting 
preferences toward standard shipping. 
 Companies may sometimes be compelled to follow certain units of time, such as 
when the entire industry follows a certain norm, or when the use of certain units is 
mandated. In such cases, if the units are not in line with what a company would ideally 
want (e.g., the units are small, lowering patience, whereas the marketer would benefit 
from the higher patience of consumers), then a manager could try to neutralize the effect 
of units. One such approach could be to induce a calculative mindset, as I did in study 6. 
 While the above techniques may help boost firm profits, public-policy makers 
need to monitor whether the manipulation of units is detrimental to consumer welfare. 
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Consider the example of credit-card use. For consumers tempted to charge hedonic 
products to their credit cards, companies may stoke impatience by using smaller units to 
make the credit-card payment seem far away (e.g., payment due in 30 days, rather than 1 
month). Such threats to the financial welfare of consumers could be countered by 
governmental organizations, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which 
may try to standardize the units of time that credit-card companies use to express 
payment schedules. In fact, such standardization could mandate units that actually help 
individuals be more patient, and better manage their finances. Thus, units could be 
employed as a valuable nudge to improve patience (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Similarly, 
to prevent the biases that may creep in due to units, consumer advocacy groups could try 
to encourage calculative mindsets in consumers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I present a novel perspective to intertemporal choice. Specifically, I find that the 
influence of time units on wait time perception and patience is a function of the nature of 
the rewards. When rewards are hedonic, larger units shrink wait time perception and 
boost patience. This effect does not arise for utilitarian rewards. Theoretically, my results 
make an important contribution the literature, by demonstrating a case where the nature 
of rewards in intertemporal choice interacts with wait time perception to jointly influence 
patience.  
78 
 
My results have important practical implications for consumer decision making. 
Consumers often face a conflict between immediate and future benefits in their everyday 
decisions. Whether it is an employee deciding on how much money from this month’s 
paycheck should be set aside as savings, or an online shopper deciding whether or not to 
splurge on expedited shipping and receive purchased goods sooner, this conflict exists. It 
is vital for consumers to understand the factors that can lead them to make better or worse 
decisions. As my results demonstrate, inducing the use of more calculation in decisions 
can make consumers more immune to biases such as numerosity, and the numerosity bias 
is more likely to affect intertemporal decisions when consumers are deciding on hedonic 
consumption.  Practitioners may use these results as a simple guide on how to influence 
consumer patience.   
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 STIMULI 
 
Hedonic condition scenario: 
“Imagine that you do not have a tablet computer at this point, but would 
like to buy one. Your friends have told you great things about one 
particular tablet. This tablet is not really for making life more efficient and 
organized, but simply for making it more fun and enjoyable. You cannot 
wait to get this tablet. You head on over to a retail website with the 
intention of buying it. You search for the tablet and arrive at its product 
page. You see the following price information: ‘Get this tablet now for 
$299!’”  
 
 
Utilitarian condition scenario: 
“Imagine that you do not have a tablet computer at this point, but would 
like to buy one. Your friends have told you great things about one 
particular tablet. This tablet is not really for making life more fun and 
enjoyable, but simply for making it more efficient and organized. You 
cannot wait to get this tablet. You head on over to a retail website with the 
intention of buying it. You search for the tablet and arrive at its product 
page. You see the following price information: ‘Get this tablet now for 
$299!’”  
 
Wait information when time unit is small: 
“However, you also notice the following on the same page: ‘A new 
version of this tablet will be releasing in 120 days for $299. It will have 
upgraded hardware and software.’ You are now faced with the decision of 
whether to buy the tablet right now, or to hold off and get the new 
version.”  
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Wait information when time unit is large: 
“However, you also notice the following on the same page: ‘A new version of this 
tablet will be releasing in 4 months for $299. It will have upgraded hardware and 
software.’ You are now faced with the decision of whether to buy the tablet right 
now, or to hold off and get the new version.” 
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APPENDIX B: STUDY 2 STIMULI 
 
Hedonic condition task: 
“Money can be spent on many different products. We want you to think 
about all the fun products that you can buy with money. For example, 
think about products that can bring you sensory pleasure, or products that 
can be used for your enjoyment. Below, please write down the names of 
three fun products that you can buy with money.” 
 
Utilitarian condition task: 
“Money can be spent on many different products. We want you to think 
about all the useful products that you can buy with money. For example, 
think about products that are functional, or products that can be used to 
accomplish a practical task. Below, please write down the names of three 
useful products that you can buy with money.” 
 
Options when time unit is small: 
Option A: Receive a $25 bonus in 48 hours 
Option B: Receive a $30 bonus in 96 hours 
 
Options when time unit is large: 
Option A: Receive a $25 bonus in 2 days 
Option B: Receive a $30 bonus in 4 days 
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APENDIX C: STUDY 3 STIMULI 
 
Scenario: 
“Imagine that you have just won a $100 Visa gift card as a prize. We would like 
to know what kind of goods you would spend the money on. So please take a 
moment to think about what you would spend the money on.” 
 
Wait information when time unit is small: 
“Now imagine that you were offered the following deal: If you wait for 14 
days before receiving your prize, you can get a $110 Visa gift card instead 
of a $100 Visa gift card.” 
 
Wait information when time unit is large: 
“Now imagine that you were offered the following deal: If you wait for 2 
weeks before receiving your prize, you can get a $110 Visa gift card 
instead of a $100 Visa gift card.” 
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APPENDIX D: STUDY 4 STIMULI 
 
Hedonic condition scenario: 
“Imagine that you are shopping online for a pair of headphones. You are looking 
for a pair that would be fun to use, and offer good clarity of musical notes. Your 
goal is to have a pleasurable experience when listening to your preferred music 
over the Internet (when using Pandora and similar services). You find a good pair 
available for $40. You then head on over to the checkout page where you are 
presented with a couple of shipping options.” 
 
Utilitarian condition scenario: 
“Imagine that you are shopping online for a pair of headphones. You are looking 
for a pair that would function reliably, and offer good clarity of voice. Your goal 
is to have an effective conversation when interviewing for your preferred jobs 
over the internet (when using Skype and similar services). You find a good pair 
available for $40. You then head on over to the checkout page where you are 
presented with a couple of shipping options.” 
 
Options when time unit is small: 
Expedited: 24 hour shipping for $4 
Standard: 72 hour shipping for $2 
 
Options when time unit is large: 
Expedited: 1 day shipping for $4 
Standard: 3 day shipping for $2 
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APPENDIX E: STUDY 5 STIMULI 
 
Scenario: 
“In order to reward you for being a loyal customer, an online retailer 
wants to offer you a free gift card. You can use this gift card on their site 
towards the purchase of any of their wide selection of goods. The retailer 
has given you two options to choose from.” 
 
Options when time unit is small: 
Option A: Receive a $100 gift card in 14 days 
Option B: Receive a $120 gift card in 56 days  
 
Options when time unit is large: 
Option A: Receive a $100 gift card in 2 weeks 
Option B: Receive a $120 gift card in 8 weeks  
 
